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Double Benefits and Transactional 
Consistency Under the Tax Benefit Rule 
LOUIS A. DEL COTTO AND KENNETH F. JOYCE * 
-"A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin
of little minds, adored by little 
statesmen and philosophers and 
divines." 
Introduction 
Over the years, the Commissioner and the courts have developed 
several rules to deny taxpayers so-called "double benefits." It is our 
thesis that although these rules have a salutary effect when properly 
applied, the fear of allowing double benefits to taxpayers has occasionally 
misled the Commissioner and the courts into improper, or at least un-
analyzed, disregard of other tax policies which are specifically expressed 
by Congress or which have been themselves developed by administrative-
judicial interplay. 
Part I 
The Rules and Their Proper Application 
A tax benefit may be provided to taxpayers by either an exclusion 
from gross income or a deduction. The word "deduction" is here used 
to include not only current outlays normally considered deductions, but 
also any reduction of gain (or increase of loss) due to past outlay, for 
example, depreciation or basis offset in determining gain or loss on sales 
under section 1001. There are four possible double combinations of 
exclusion and deduction; thus the rules designed to prevent double bene-
fits have naturally arisen in four general types of situations. 
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Rule Against Deduction-Deduction 
First, the regulations state in several places that "double deductions 
are not permitted." 2 Some examples come readily to mind. If T has de-
ducted a repair cost under section 162, the expenditure cannot again be 
deducted as a loss under section 165 or as depreciation under section 
167 or 168.1 If T, an accrual basis taxpayer, has deducted accrued in-
terest, the payment of the interest cannot also be deducted. 
In other instances, the application of the rule is less obvious, although 
nonetheless proper. Suppose in year 1 T has $20,000 of gross income 
from oil operations, and for that year properly deducts $5,500 (27.5% ) 
as percentage depletion. Suppose further T is required to refund $10,000 
to its customers in year 2 because its year 1 receipts could not legally 
exceed $10,000. If T could not have taken any cost depletion in year 1 
because its basis in the oil well had been reduced to zero by previous 
depletion allowances,4 T should be allowed a deduction of only $7,250 
($10,000 - $2,750) for the refund made in year 2. If T were allowed 
a $10,000 deduction in year 2, $2,750 of the refund would be deducted 
twice, once as percentage depletion in year 1 and again as a loss in year 
2. The Supreme Court so held in United States v. Skelly Oil Co.' 
Rule Against Deduction-Exclusion 
Second, there is the tax benefit rule, which, in its narrowest formula-
tion, prevents exclusion of a recovery of a prior expenditure if the ex-
penditure was deducted with tax benefit. It is probably the most well 
known of the four rules. One of the clearest examples of its application 
is Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States. The taxpayer gave 
property to a charity subject to a condition, but received the property 
back again in a later year because the charity no longer complied with 
the condition. Because a charitable deduction had been taken for the 
gift, the court required the taxpayer to include in its income for the year 
of the recovery an amount equal to the previous deduction. Other 
familiar examples are refunds of state income taxes previously taken as 
itemized deductions under section 164, and the payments received on 
debts previously deducted as bad debts under section 166.1 
2See, e.g., Reg. §§ 1.161-1(a), 1.212-1(o), 1.1016-6(a) ("adjustments must 
always be made to eliminate double deductions or their equivalent"). 
3 National Bronx Bank v. Commissioner, 3 T.C.M. (CCH) 60 (1944). 
4Revenue Ruling 75-451, 1975-2 C.B. 330, provides that depletion cannot 
reduce basis below zero. 
5394 U.S. 678 (1969). This case is discussed further in Part II of this 
article. 
6 381 F.2d 399 (Cl. Ct. 1967). 
7The tax benefit rule has a corollary that no inclusion is required where the 
previous deduction did not benefit the taxpayer. See I.R.C. § 111. 
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The tax benefit rule also has less obvious, but nonetheless proper, 
applications. In one of the two companion cases decided by the Su-
preme Court in HillsboroNational Bank v.Commissioner, a corpora-
tion deducted an amount which it had paid for feed grain in its dairy 
operations. In a subsequent year, before it had used the feed grain in its 
business, the corporation distributed the grain to its shareholders in com-
plete liquidation. The Court held that the tax benefit rule required an 
inclusion in the corporation's gross income for the year of the liquidation 
equal to the amount of the earlier deduction. The Court reformulated 
the rule as follows: 
The purpose of the rule is not simply to tax "recoveries." On the contrary, 
it is to approximate the results produced by a tax system based on trans-
actional rather than annual accounting. [The tax benefit rule will
"cancel out" an earlier deduction ...when a... later event is funda-
mentally inconsistent with the premise on which the deduction was initially 
based.9 
Rule Against Exclusion-Deduction 
There is, third, a rule which prevents the deduction of an amount 
previously excluded. An example of this rule is found in DetroitEdison 
Co. v. Commissioner."0 The taxpayer, a utility company, received pay-
ments from its customers for the construction of service facilities. The 
company did not include these payments in income, but took deprecia-
tion deductions on the facilities in a later year. The Supreme Court up-
held the denial of the deductions, stating: 
[The receipts] have not been taxed as income, presumably because it has 
been thought to be precluded by this Court's decisions in Edward v. Cuba 
R. Co., 268 U.S. 628, holding that under the circumstances of that case a 
government subsidy to induce railroad construction was not income. But 
it does not follow that the Company must be permitted to recoup through 
untaxed depreciation accruals on investment it had refused to make."' 
s103 S. Ct. 1134 (1983). 
9Id.at 1142-43. 
10 319 U.S. 98 (1943). 
11 1d. at 103. Under § 113(a) (8) of the 1939 Code, the taxpayer would have 
taken a carryover basis if the payments were considered a "contribution to capi-
tal." The Court refused to consider them as such. But see Brown Shoe Co. v. 
Commissioner, 339 U.S. 583 (1950). The stakes in controversy over when a 
payment by a nonshareholder is a contribution to capital by a nonshareholder are 
lessened under the 1954 Code by § 362(c) which, consistently with Detroit Edi-
son, gives a corporation a zero basis in property it receives as a contribution to 
capital from a nonshareholder. See generally United States v. Chicago, B. & Q. 
R.R., 412 U.S. 401 (1973). 
Hintz v. Commissioner, 712 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1983), raised the exclusion-
deduction problem in another context. The taxpayer received sick pay and un-
employment benefits, but was required to repay them in a subsequent year. The 
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Rule Against Exclusion-Exclusion 
Fourth is the rule that prevents a second exclusion of an amount pre-
viously excluded. The clearest application of this rule is United States v. 
Kirby Lumber Co.,12 where the Court established the principle that a 
discharge of indebtedness is gross income. Borrowed money is initially 
excluded from the borrower's gross income because it is presumed that 
the debt will be repaid. If the debt is instead discharged at arm's length 
without payment, the gain on the discharge cannot also be excluded, 
but is gross income. 
Another, perhaps less obvious, application of this rule is the holding 
of Crane v. Commissioner 3 (as clarified by Commissioner v. Tufts") 
that the face amount of a mortgage note must be included in the amount 
realized on disposition of the encumbered property, even if the note is a 
nonrecourse obligation and even if the fair market value of the property 
is less than the amount of the note. Because the amount borrowed is 
excluded at the outset, it must be included (cannot be excluded) when 
the debt is shed. 
Common Threads 
The four rules preventing double benefits have much in common. 
First, all of them are designed to prevent distortion of a taxpayer's true 
income picture-to prevent a false reflection of a taxpayer's true eco-
nomic gain. To illustrate: 
Rule 1: No deduction-deduction 
Year 1: T pays $25 to repair a roof on business property, and de-
ducts $25 in year 1 against income of $1,000. T's taxable income 
thus is $975. 
Year 2: A storm destroys the repair made in year 1. T has income 
of $1,000. T is not allowed a loss deduction for year 2 for the value 
of the repair. There has been an economic loss, but there has not 
been a tax loss because the deduction in year 1 left the repair with a 
basis of zero and section 165(b) limits a loss deduction to the basis 
of the lost property. If T were allowed to deduct the value of the re-
benefits received were excluded from gross income. The court held the taxpayer's 
deduction of the repayment was barred by Skelly Oil. The court noted that Skelly 
Oil was a double deduction case, but decided nevertheless that the "underlying 
principle" of Skelly Oil precludes a deduction for a repayment of an item ex-
cluded from gross income on receipt in a previous year. Hintz is discussed 
further infra note 75. 
12 284 U.S. 1 (1931). 
13 331 U.S. 1 (1947). 
14 103 S. Ct. 1826 (1983). 
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pair against the year 2 income of $1,000, T would pay tax on only 
$1,950 over the two years, even though his economic gain for these 
years is $1,975. 
Rule 2: No deduction-exclusion 
Year 1: T contributes $25 to charity, and deducts it against gross 
income of $1,000. His taxable income is $975. 
Year 2: T recovers $25 from the charity because of noncompli-
ance with conditions of the charitable gift. His taxable income, apart 
from this transaction, is $1,000 for year 2. The recovery is gross in-
come, and increases year 2 taxable income to $1,025. If T could 
exclude this $25 recovery, then over the two years T would have eco-
nomic gain of $2,000, but would pay tax on only Si,975. 
Rule 3: No exclusion-deduction 
Year 1: T, with a basis of $60,000 in Blackacre, receives $50,000 
from X in return for granting X the right to flood Blackacre. Because 
the potential damage to T's land from the flooding easement cannot 
be ascertained, none of the $50,000 received from X is gross income. 
Year 2: T sells Blackacre for $25,000. T's gain is $15,000. Ts 
basis in Blackacre was reduced by $50,000 to $10,000 in year I be-
cause of his exclusion of the $50,000 received from X. If T were 
allowed to keep his old basis of $60,000 and thus had no gain on the 
sale in year 2, his economic gain of $15,000 from Blackacre (receipts 
of $50,000 and $25,000 less cost of $60,000) would go wholly un-
taxed. 
Rule 4: No exclusion-exclusion 
Year 1: T borrows $25 from banker B. The borrowed amount is 
not gross income. 
Year 2: Banker B forgives T's debt in order to retain T as a busi-
ness client. If T were allowed to exclude the $25 debt discharge, his 
economic gain of $25 from the borrowing transaction would never be 
taxed. 
These examples illustrate our first point, that the rules preventing double 
benefits are required to reflect a taxpayer's true economic picture. 
The second point about the four rules proceeds from the first. Basi-
cally, the four rules are one rule and can be restated in much the same 
way as the Supreme Court restated the tax benefit rule in Hillsboro. The 
unifying principle of the rules is that of transactional consistency, and 
their unified purpose is to achieve what the Court in Hillsboro called 
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"transactional equity." 5 All of these rules require that a taxpayer who 
has excluded a receipt or taken a deduction must treat subsequent events 
consistently with the exclusion or deduction, so as to achieve a trans-
actional equity that prevents a false reflection of economic gain. 
In Hillsboro, the Court rejected a reading of the tax benefit rule that 
would restrict its application to recoveries. The court broadened the 
rule to require an inclusion whenever a "later event is... fundamentally 
inconsistent with the premise on which the deduction was initially 
based." 10 We further broaden the tax benefit rule so that (1) it applies 
whether the prior benefit was a deduction or an exclusion, and (2) the 
reach of the rule is not limited to later inconsistent events, but extends 
to promote more generally the objective of consistency in the treatment 
of later events. For example, we say that Rule 3, which prevents exclu-
sion-deduction, as in Detroit Edison, is based on the same principle as 
Rule 2, which prevents deduction-exclusion as in Hillsboro. In Rule 3, 
the prior tax benefit is an exclusion, and the deduction is denied in the 
later year not because an inconsistent event has occurred, but rather to 
give consistency with the earlier exclusion. Thus, in a Rule 3 case, just 
as in a Rule 2 case, the treatment in the later year is required to avoid a 
fundamental inconsistency with the treatment in the earlier year. 
Our third and final point about these rules leads directly to the second 
part and burden of this article: All of these rules rest on the assumption 
that tax results which truly reflect economic gain always further, and 
never conflict with, congressional, administrative, or judicial tax policies. 
In the examples discussed above, and in many, perhaps most other cases, 
the paramount objective should be to reflect true economic gain. In sev-
eral situations, however, this objective is, or at least arguably is, over-
ridden by other policies. In these cases, as we show in Part Two, the 
proper result is achieved only by an inaccurate reflection of economic 
gain in contravention of the rules discussed above. 
Part H 
In General 
The rules discussed in the preceding part prevent the unwarranted 
doubling of income tax benefits, and keep taxpayers' tax positions con-
sistent with their economic positions. Nevertheless, in each of the cate-
gories discussed, there are exceptions or modifications that allow double 
benefits, and cause tax results that are inconsistent with taxpayers' eco-
nomic positions. This phenomenon occurs when a congressional intent 
15 Id. at 1146. 
16 Id. (footnote omitted). 
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to that effect can be discerned, either expressed or implied. There are 
instances where Congress has addressed the issue directly and has spoken 
clearly either for or against the allowance of double benefits. Sections 
102 and 1014 illustrate the former, and sections 126(d) and 127(c) (7) 
are examples of the latter. There are other situations where the intent 
to allow double benefits can be implied, for example, where the disallow-
ance of a deduction would deny an exclusion Congress clearly intended 
to give. 
This Part of the article discusses situations, including some in each of 
the four categories described in Part One, in which double benefits are 
allowable. These situations are contrasted with those in which double 
benefits are disallowed. 
An equally important purpose of this Part is to develop further the 
unifying principle which allows seemingly different categories to be 
analyzed under a single principle of law. As previously stated, we think 
that unifying principle is the tax benefit rule, as explained and defined 
17 in HilIsboro NationalBank v. Commissioner. 
In other words, the rules against double benefits do not mechanically 
take away every double benefit. The question must be asked in each case 
whether the allowance of the second benefit is, in the words of the Hills-
boro court, "fundamentally inconsistent" with the allowance of the first 
benefit. If the intent of Congress is that the second benefit be allowed, 
then, under the Hillsboro approach, there is no inconsistency in allowing 
the double benefit. 
No Double Deduction for One Expenditure 
Skelly Oil Revisited 
The rule against double deductions is illustrated in Part I with United 
States v. Skelly Oil Co."' Assume the following example, a simplified 
version of the facts in Skelly Oil: A taxpayer purchases an oil lease for 
$100,000. In year 1, it sells oil at a price set by a regulatory agency, 
recognizing gross income of $20,000. It takes percentage depletion at 
the rate of 27.5% of gross income. In year 2, the price charged in year 
1 is held invalid, and the taxpayer refunds to customers $10,000 of the 
gross income of year 1. The Court held that only $7,250 of the refund 
can be deducted for year 2 because a deduction of the last 27.5% 
($2,750) of the refund would duplicate the depletion deduction taken 
in year 1. If such a duplication were permitted, the Court noted, $1.275 
would be deducted for every dollar refunded.'" The $2,750 would be 
3. 103 S. Ct. 1134 (1983).
18 394 U.S. 678 (1969). 
19 Id. at 684. 
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deducted twice. Another way to explain the disallowance is to say that 
the basis in the refunded $10,000, for purposes of the year 2 deduction, 
is only $7,250 because only 72.5% of $10,000 is taxed on receipt and 
the tax cost of the receipt is thus only $7,250. Under section 165(b), 
a loss deduction is limited to the basis of the property lost-$7,250 in 
20 this case. 
In the words of the Court, "the Code should not be interpreted to 
allow respondent 'the practical equivalent of [a] double deduction,'... 
absent a clear declaration of intent by Congress." 21 The Court con-
sidered whether section 1341 demonstrated that intent. Section 1341 
(a) (2) speaks of a "deduction" allowable in year 2 because the tax-
payer did not have an unrestricted right to an "item." The "item" re-
ferred to in section 1341 (a) (1) is the item included in gross income in 
year 1, here $10,000. 
The taxpayer argued, and Justice Stewart agreed in dissent, that the 
deduction was in the amount of the item, $10,000, and could not, con-
sistently with section 1341, be reduced under a double deduction 
-theory. The dissent made a related point that section 1341 is a relief 
provision for taxpayers in that it either reduces the tax for year 2 by the 
tax cost of the inclusion in year 1 or treats the repayment as a deduction 
in year 2, whichever is more favorable to the taxpayer. Therefore, in 
every case, the provision either makes the tax benefit of the repayment 
greater than the tax cost of the receipt (when the year 2 deduction is 
allowed), or gives the taxpayer a benefit larger than he would get if he 
were forced to deduct in year 2 (when the year 2 tax is reduced by the 
tax cost in year 1 of the inclusion).,3 
The majority said that repayments of depletable income, if fully de-
ductible, would create a situation where "the taxpayer always wins and 
the Government always loses" and that such an "inequitable result" could 
20 Id. at 685 n.4. This analysis recalls the dissent in Perry v. United States, 160 
F. Supp. 270 (Ct. CI. 1958), overruled by Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United 
States, 381 F.2d 399 (Ct. CI. 1967). The taxpayer had given property to a charity 
subject to a possibility of a reverter, and had taken a charitable deduction for the 
gift. The property was later returned to the taxpayer. The dissent argued (1) the 
taxpayer's deduction of the gift left the possibility of reverter with a zero basis 
and (2) the taxpayer's gain on the recovery of the property (amount realized on 
the recovery less basis) thus equalled the fair market value of the property when 
recovered. Following this analysis on the facts of the Skelly Oil example, the 
$2,750 denied as a deduction had no basis for deduction purposes. See also I.R.C. 
§ 362(c) (property received as a contribution to corporate capital from one who 
is not a shareholder has a basis of zero). 
21 394 U.S. 684, quoting in part Charles Ilfeld Co. v. Hernandez, 292 U.S. 62, 
68 (1934). 
22 Id. at 682-83; see also id. at 693-94 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
23 d. at 692 n.1 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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not have been intended by Congress 4 Justice Stewart dismissed this 
plaintive observation, saying section 1341 "is designed precisely to 
create" such a situation.25 
The majority properly prevailed on this point. Justice Stewart's first 
assertion-that the deduction is measured by the item-finds no support
in the language of the statute or the leislative history. The statute 
merely states that as a condition of its operation, a deduction must be 
allowable. It does not pretend to allow a deduction. That is the function
of section 162 or 165. -6 The only advantage intended is with respect 
to tax rates and brackets; that is, section 1341 maximizes the tax relief 
by determining the benefit of the deduction at the taxpayer's tax rate in 
year 1 or 2, whichever is higher.2 The statute was not intended to allow 
double deductions. Also, section 1341 changed the law only by its addi-
tion of section 1341 (a) (5), the provision that reduces year 2 tax by the 
tax cost of the year 1 inclusion if this reduction is greater than the tax 
savings produced by a year 2 deduction. Skelly Oil took its deduction 
for year 2, following the rule of prior law embodied in section 1341 (a) 
(4), for which no change was intended. " 
Questions Unanswered by Skelly Oil 
We endorse the methodology of Skelly Oil in searching for an over-
riding congressional intent to allow double deductions. The question is 
whether the Court went far enough in this direction. In the example, 
section 1016(a) reduces the basis in the lease by $2,750, the amount of 
the depletion deduction in year 1. The $2,750 that is untaxed in year 1 
is a recovery of previously taxed capital, the outlay for the lease. The 
second deduction is for a separate and distinct outlay of $10,000. There 
is no double deduction of any one expenditure. The Skelly opinion does 
not allude to this, nor does it suggest that to the extent of the disallowed 
deduction, basis should be restored. 9 
Even though the double deduction prohibition is not operative in the 
d. at 686. 
25 Id. at 692 n.1 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
2 6 M. at 682-83. 
27 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 451 (1954), indicates that § 1341 was 
enacted to reverse the result of United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951),
which held that a taxpayer who repaid money received and held under a claim 
of right was entitled only to a deduction in the year of repayment. See generally 
Rabinovitz, Effect of Prior Year's Transactions on the Income Tax Consequences 
of CurrentReceipts or Paymnents,28 TAx L. REv. 85, 112-15 (1972).
28 S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 27, at 118, 451. 
29 Justice Stewart flirts with the problem. He points out that adjusted basis is 
reduced by depletion, 394 U.S. at 695 n.5, but does not discuss the effect on basis 
of a disallowance of part of the deduction. 
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example, the tax benefit rule is. Repayment in year 2 is an event incon-
sistent with the percentage depletion deduction for year 1 to the extent 
of $2,750. Or, using an alternative test stated in Hillsboro, the tax 
benefit rule operates "if the occurrence of the event in the earlier year 
would have resulted in the disallowance of the deduction."" If, in the 
Skelly Oil example, the $10,000 refund had occurred in year 1, the re-
funded amount would not have been gross income, 31 and the percentage 
depletion deduction for year 1 would have been $2,750 less. 
The gross income in year 2 under the tax benefit rule, however, is not 
necessarily $2,750. If cost depletion had been taken in year 1, the re-
fund in year 2 would not be inconsistent with this deduction because 
cost depletion, like depreciation, is not measured by gross income."" 
Up to allowable cost depletion in year 1, the percentage depletion de-
duction gave no tax benefit that cost depletion would not have given. 
Assume that cost depletion for year 1 would have been $5,000. If the 
refunded $10,000 had been returned to customers in year 1, percentage 
depletion would have been only $2,750, and the taxpayer would have 
taken cost depletion of $5,000 instead. The latter figure is only $500 
less than the percentage depletion of $5,500 actually taken. The refund 
is thus fundamentally inconsistent with only $500 of the deduction in 
30 103 S. Ct. at 1146. See also id. at 1143-44 ("[T]he tax benefit rule will 
'cancel out' an earlier deduction only when . . . the later event is indeed funda-
mentally inconsistent with the premise on which the deduction was initially based. 
That is, if that event had occurred within the same taxable year, it would have 
foreclosed the deduction.") 
31 As authority for such an exclusion, one might cite Spitalny v. United States, 
430 F.2d 195, 198 (9th Cir. 1970), and Anders v. United States, 462 F.2d 1147, 
1149 (Ct. C1.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). The taxpayers in those cases 
incurred costs in selling property incident to their liquidations, but, under § 337(a), 
recognized no gain or loss on the sales. Because the costs were recouped by sales 
made during the same year and because the sales were nonrecognition transactions, 
the court held the costs nondeductible. 
In Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 272 (1966), in con-
trast, the Supreme Court refused to disallow the depreciation deduction for the 
year depreciable property is sold, even though the deduction is recouped as addi-
tional gain on the sale and under the law then in effect this gain was taxed at 
capital gain rates. The taxpayer in Commissioner v. Anders, 414 F.2d 1283, 
1288 (10th Cir. 1969), argued that the tax benefit doctrine did not require recog-
nition of gain on a § 337 sale of fully expensed linens because the prior deduction 
of the costs of the linens was like the depreciation in FribourgNavigation. The 
court disagreed, distinguishing FribourgNavigation on the grounds that (1) de-
preciation allowances reflect actual wear and tear, whereas the taxpayer's linens 
had been expensed before they were used at all and (2) the depreciation in Fri-
bourg Navigation, unlike the taxpayer's deductions, was not a deduction of the 
full cost of property. 
32 See Rabinovitz, supra note 27, at 111; 394 U.S. at 698 (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing). 
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year 1. The taxpayer should therefore have only $500 of gross income 
in year 2 under the tax benefit rule. The basis of the lease should also 
be increased by $500 because the depletion deduction reduced basis in 
year 1.3
3 
Skelly Oil and the Tax Benefit Rule 
The above discussion illustrates that the double deduction rule of 
Skelly Oil is not simple to apply, and should certainly not be applied 
mechanically to all seeming or apparent double deductions. Indeed, it 
was erroneously applied in Skelly Oil if, as in the example, the taxpayer 
had a basis other than zero for the depleted deposit and this basis was 
reduced by the depletion deduction in year 1. To remove any temptation 
to decide cases according to labels such as double deduction, and also 
to find a unifying principle, the analysis of double benefit cases should 
proceed entirely under the tax benefit rule. Skelly Oil itself noted the
"analogous approach" of the tax benefit rule, citing Alice PhelanSullivan 
Corp. v. United States34 and section 111.15 Under the tax benefit rule, 
the year 2 deduction should be disallowed to the extent it is fundamen-
tally inconsistent with the deduction in year 2. 
Hillsboromakes it quite clear that a fundamental inconsistency is not 
necessarily present in every double benefit case. Thus, the Court rejected 
its perception of the government's formulation of the tax benefit rule-
that the rule prevails over all nonrecognition provisions." The Court 
noted that the government's position implied, contrary to widely ac-
cepted decisions, that a previous deduction must be recaptured on a gift 
of an expensed item", or a transfer of expensed property at death."' In 
33 Under Skelly Oil's double deduction theory, if the percentage depletion de-
duction were based on adjusted gross income rather than on gross income, the 
$10,000 refund, if fully deductible, would reduce year 2 adjusted gross income in 
that amount, and would thus automatically reduce year 2 depletion by $2,750. 
There would be no need to adjust the deduction of the refund. The Court noted 
this phenomenon and suggested this result, but found it had no application since 
depletion is, in fact, based on gross income. 394 U.S. at 686. See generally 
Rabinovitz, supra note 27, at 117-153 (discussing a variety of tax situations in-
volving this refinement of Skelly Oil). 
34381 F.2d 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967). 
35 394 U.S. at 686 n.5. Putoma Corp. v. Commissioner, 601 F.2d 734, 743 
(5th Cir. 1979), also rejected the Commissioner's argument that the tax benefit 
rule applies "across the board." 
36 103 S. Ct. 1134, 1145 (1983).
7 Id. at 1145 n.20. For a discussion of the decided cases and rulings, see id. 
See also Carrington v. Commissioner, 476 F.2d 704 (5th Cir. 1973); Del Cotto, 
Basis and Amount Realized Under Crane: A Current View of Some Tax Effects 
in MortgageFinancing, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 69, 91 nn.112-14 (1969). 
38 Cf.Del Cotto & Joyce, InheritedExcess Mortgage Property: Death and the 
Inherited Tax Shelter, 34 TAX L. REV. 569 (1979). 
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particular, it cited Campbell v. Prothro39 to illustrate the tension be-
tween the tax benefit rule and nonrecognition rules. Prothro is particu-
larly relevant to Skelly Oil because it is also a double deduction case. 
Campbell v. Prothro and the Allowable 
Double Deduction 
The taxpayer in Campbell v. Prothro40 donated calves to a charity, 
which promptly sold them for cash. The costs of maintaining and raising 
the livestock had been deducted by the taxpayer, and he also took a 
charitable deduction for the value of the gift. The calves apparently 
were offspring of cattle owned by the taxpayer's ranching partnership, 
and there was no basis therein for depreciation. 41 The calves were ap-
parently held for sale to customers in the ordinary course of the tax-
payer's business.42 The Commissioner included as ordinary income to 
the taxpayer the fair market value of the calves at the date of the gift. 
His theory, first stated in I.T. 3910 and I.T. 3932,"1 was that a gift of 
an ordinary income asset is a recognition event within the anticipatory 
assignment of income doctrine, as developed in Helvering v. Horst"r and 
related cases. The Court held for the taxpayer, distinguishing Horst on 
the ground that in Horst the taxpayer had given a right to income (in-
terest coupons) and kept the property (bond) that produced the income, 
whereas the taxpayer in Prothro transfererd both "principal and inter-
est." 46 The net result was a double deduction: the deduction for the 
expense of raising the calves and the charitable deduction. 
After Prothro, I.T. 3910 and I.T. 3932 were revoked by Revenue 
Rulings 55-138 17 and 55-531,4s respectively. Revenue Ruling 55-138, 
however, requires adjustments to prevent double deductions.49 It re-
quires that the cost of inventory given to charity be removed from the 
taxpayer's inventory account. If an expensed item is given to charity, 
the ruling requires that deductions for expenses for the year of the gift 
be reduced by the cost of the item or that the charitable deduction be 
reduced by the amount deducted for the item in a prior year. 
Section 170(e) (1) (A), enacted in 1969, avoids the double deduction 
39 209 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1954). 
40 d. 
41Id. at 332 n.2. 
42Id. at 333-34. Cf. I.R.C. § 1231(b) (3) for livestock held for breeding, 
dairy, or sporting purposes.
43 1948-1 C.B. 15. 
44 1948-2 C.B. 7. 
45 311 U.S. 112 (1940). 
46 209 F.2d at 335. 
47 1955-1 C.B. 223. 
48 1955-2 C.B. 520. 
49 Rev. Rul. 55-138, supra note 47, at 225. 
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in a different way: It disallows the charitable deduction for the ordinary 
income (including short-term capital gain) component in gifted prop-
erty.1' The congressional policy to allow the full deduction without 
recognition of unrealized gain thus has changed. 
Nevertheless, the policy of Congress is to give a double benefit on a 
gift of expensed or appreciated property whenever section 170(e) does 
not apply. Section 170(a) gives a deduction for the value of property 
given to charity, even if its basis is much lower or even zero.' 1 If the 
value exceeds basis because the property has appreciated, the rules ex-
clude the unrealized appreciation from gross income, but allow the entire 
value, including the appreciation, as a charitable deduction. The policy 
to allow this double benefit logically extends to allow the double benefit 
of two deductions when the basis of property given to charity is zero 
because its cost has been expensed. 
52-
5o Section 170(e) (1) (B) (i) disallows 40% of the amount that would have 
been capital gain on a sale of the property if (1) the property is tangible personal 
property that is unrelated to the purpose or function of the charity or (2) the donee 
is a private foundation. Also, the flush language of this subsection provides that 
§ 1231(b) property (except for the portion of its value which would be ordinary 
income on sale under § 1245 or some other recapture rule) is treated as a capital 
asset. Thus, even if the calves in Prothrohad not been inventory, but had instead 
been breeding or dairy stock (made subject to § 1231 by § 1231(b)(3)) outside 
of the scope of § 1245 (due to lack of depreciation), they would nevertheless be 
subject to § 170(e) (1) (B) (i)on a gift to the Y.M.C.A. 
Section 170(e) was enacted because the prior tax consequences of a gift of 
ordinary income property-no tax on the appreciation in the property (apprecia-
tion that on sale would have been taxed at the taxpayer's top marginal rate), 
combined with a charitable deduction of this appreciation from other income 
(reducing tax at the taxpayer's top marginal rate)-was seen as too much of a 
good thing. Indeed, prior to reduction of the top marginal tax bracket to 50%, 
a prominent politician's gift to charity of his papers (which had a zero basis) 
produced a tax savings greater than the amount he would have had after taxes if 
he had (1) sold the papers, (2) been taxed on the proceeds of the sale as ordinary 
income, and (3) kept the after tax proceeds for himself. See STAFF OF THE 
JoiNT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENuE TAXATION, 91ST CONG., lST SESS., 
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 77-79 (Comm. Print 
1970). 
Revenue Rulings 55-138 and 55-531, supra notes 47-48, have not been re-
voked despite the passage of § 170(e) in 1969. The adjustments required by 
Revenue Ruling 55-138, however, are not inconsistent with § 170(e). The re-
quirement that the cost of inventory given to charity be removed from the donor's 
inventory account simply insures that this cost is not again deducted indirectly as 
a cost of goods sold. If a charitable gift is made of a normally expensed item, 
but Revenue Ruling 55-138 requires that the expensing deduction be denied, the 
item has a basis equal to its cost, and § 170(e) (1) reduces the charitable deduc-
tion only by the excess of value over cost. In a case where Revenue Ruling 55-
138 reduces the charitable deduction for a gift of an item expensed in an earlier 
year, the ruling has the same consequence as § 170(e).
51 Reg. § 1.170A-1 (c)(1).
52 See generally Del Cotto, supra note 37, at 91 n.114. 
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Section 170 (e) usually takes this double deduction away because gain 
on a sale of expensed property is typically ordinary income and the 
thrust of section 170(e) is against ordinary income property. It is still 
possible, however, to get a double deduction for expensed capital gain 
property. Sections 1231(b)(3) and 170(e)(1) treat dairy cattle, for 
example, as capital gain property for this purpose. If a farmer deducts 
all costs of raising dairy cattle and then gives them to charity, a chari-
table deduction is allowed for the full value of the cattle, and there is 
thus a double deduction. " A double deduction can also be had by a 
charitable gift of depreciable real property. Suppose a taxpayer pur-
chases an apartment building for $300,000, takes depreciation deduc-
tions on a straight line basis, and then contributes the property to a 
charity when its value is still $300,000. Under Campbell v. Prothro, 
the gift is not a taxable event. Also, the charitable contribution deduc-
tion is not reduced under section 170(e) because (1) there is no ordi-
nary income under the recapture rules on a disposition of residential real 
property depreciated on a straight line method,5 4 and (2) the building 
is thus section 1231 (b) property to which section 170(e) (1) (A) does 
not apply.55 These results are consistent with the intent of Congress to 
allow double benefits for charitable contributions. Also, under the tax 
benefit rule, the charitable gift is not an event fundamentally inconsistent 
with the depreciation deductions. 
Haverly v. United States: Campbell v. 
Prothro Revisited 
Suppose a law professor receives an unsolicited complimentary copy 
of a book from a publisher, uses it in preparing for his classes, and in a 
later year donates it to the law library of his school, taking a charitable 
contribution deduction for its then value. There was a similar scenario 
in Haverly v. United States,56 where an elementary school principal re-
ceived unsolicited sample textbooks in 1967 and 1968 in the hope he 
would use them in his curriculum. In 1968, he donated the books to the 
school library and took a charitable deduction for their value. As in 
Haverly, the Commissioner would require that the law professor include 
the value of the book in gross income because his use of the book and 
subsequent gift to charity are an exercise of dominion and control. The 
53 The charitable deduction is reduced by 40% in this case, however, unless the 
property is related to the donee's charitable function and the charity is not a pri-
vate foundation. See supra note 50. 
54There is no depreciation for § 1250(a) (1) to recapture since there is no
"additional depreciation" within the meaning of § 1250(b) (1).
55 I.R.C. § 170(e) (flush language).
56 513 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1975). 
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Seventh Circuit would uphold the Commissioner. Receipt of the book is 
a clear accession to wealth under Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass 
Co.,17 said the court, and the taking of the charitable deduction meets 
the further requirement of that case that the taxpayer have "complete 
dominion" over such wealth. 
The problem of unsolicited samples was first addressed by the Service 
in Revenue Ruling 70-330,58 which held that receipt and retention re-
sulted in gross income under the Glenshaw Glass definition. No gift to 
charity was involved. This ruling was superseded by Revenue Ruling 
70-498,11 where the facts were the same as in the earlier ruling, except 
the books were the subject of a deducted charitable contribution. The 
books were held to be gross income to the extent of their value when 
received, a result cited and discussed with approval in Haverly.3 
The court in Haverly said the taxpayer had gross income because he 
gave the books to charity and deducted the gift. This seemingly conflicts 
with Campbell v. Prothro,which held that the making of a charitable 
gift did not trigger income recognition, and yet Prothro is not discussed 
in the Haverly opinion. Perhaps, Prothrowas not mentioned because in 
Haverly, unlike Prothro,there was no clearly apparent double deduction. 
In fact, however, there is a double deduction in cases like Haverly. The 
entire scenario in the law professor example might be as follows: (1) 
Upon receipt of the book, the law professor has gross income in the 
amount of the value thereof under section 61 and Glenshaw Glass." 
(2) As a result, he acquires a tax cost basis equal to this value02 and 
takes a deduction under section 162(a) equal to the basis,' thereby 
57 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
58 1970-1 C.B. 14. 
59 1970-2 C.B. 6. 
60 The amount of the income in Haverly v. United States, supra note 56, was 
not in issue since the value of the books was stipulated to have been S400 both 
on receipt and at the time of the gift. If the book declined in value-if it were, 
for example, a copy of the Internal Revenue Code, new when received but quite 
dated when given to charity a year later-and if the taxpayer exercised dominion 
over the book only by his act of giving it away and taking a charitable deduction 
for the gift, apparently only the lesser value at the time of the gift would be gross 
income under Haverly.
6 1 See Rev. Rul. 70-330, supra note 59. 
6 2 Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. 
Cl. 1954). 
63 The regulations do not require capitalization and depreciation for assets with 
short lives or small costs, such as short lived books (Reg. § 1.162-6), farmers' 
tools (Reg. § 1.162-12, but see I.R.C. § 464), materials and supplies (Reg. § 
1.162-3). See generally 4 BrrTrKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND 
GiFrS 20.4.1 (1981) (discussing the above regulations). The court in Hills-
boro ascribes to these regulations the purpose of relieving taxpayers of the ac-
counting burden of capitalizing or inventorying such items by allowing them an 
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washing out the income. 4 (3) On the transfer to the charity, a second 
deduction is taken. So viewed, Haverly is Campbell v. Prothroin slightly 
different garb, and the result should be the same as in Prothro." 
No Exclusion of Receipt of Item 
Previously Expensed 
Hillsboro Revisited 
This rule is illustrated in Part I mainly with Hillsboro National 
0Bank v. Commissioner." Of the two cases consolidated for review in 
Hillsboro,only one is of interest here. In that case, a corporation oper-
ated a dairy and in year 1 deducted the entire cost of the cattle feed pur-
chased for use in operations. Two days into year 2, the taxpayer adopted 
a plan of liquidation and distributed its assets, including a substantial 
portion of the feed deducted in year 1, to its shareholders in a section 
expense deduction on purchase. 103 S. Ct. at 1144 n.17. The regulations were 
also approved in Gudmundsson v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1249 (1978). 
Section 179 gives relief comparable to these regulations.
64 The wash effect described in the text could also be obtained by analyzing the 
transaction as though the professor had ordered the book, was billed for it, and 
the bill had been forgiven to induce him to order books from the publisher for 
his classes. Under section 108(e) (2), the discharge of the debt would not be 
gross income because the payment of the liability would have given rise to a de-
duction. The effect of section 108(e) (2) is to treat the professor as though he 
had paid his bill, deducted the amount paid, and then received the payment back 
as gross income. 
6 Does section 170(e) (1) (A) greatly reduce the significance of the issue for 
years after 1969? The expensing of an item leaves it with a zero basis, and gain 
on a sale of an expensed item has been held to be ordinary income, not protected 
by § 337. E.g., Anders v. United States, 462 F.2d 1147 (Ct. Cl. 1972). See also 
Merchants National Bank v. Commissioner, 199 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1952). Sec-
tion 170(e) (1) (A), which reduces the charitable deduction by the ordinary in-
come that would have been realized on a sale of the gifted property, thus argu-
ably reduces the deduction for a charitable gift of expensed items to zero. 
There is an argument, however, that § 170(e) (1) (A) does not apply to an 
expensed item used in a taxpayer's trade or business. Under § 170(c) (1), "prop-
erty which is property used in the trade or business (as defined in section 1231(b)) 
shall be treated as a capital asset," except to the extent gain on sale would be 
ordinary under the recapture rules. Sections 1245 and 1250 do not apply to re-
capture the gain potential since expensing has been held not to be a method of 
depreciation. E.g., Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner, 103 S. Ct. 1134, 
1151 (1983); Commissioner v. Anders, 414 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir. 1969). Section 
1231(b), in turn, does apply because it refers to property used in business "of a 
character which is subject to the allowance for depreciation." Arguably, an ex-
pensed item used in business is of a "character" subject to depreciation, even 
though depreciation deductions are not allowed because basis is zero. Gain on 
a sale of an expensed item therefore is arguably characterized by § 170(e) (1) as a 
capital asset. 
06 103 S. Ct. 1134 (1983). 
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333 liquidation. The Commissioner required the corporation to take into 
income the value of the grain distributed under the tax benefit rule. He 
argued that no "recovery" of a previously deducted item was necessary 
to make the tax benefit rule applicable, only an event which is "incon-
sistent with the past deduction" and which, if it had occurred in the 
earlier year, would have resulted in a disallowance of the deduction.' 7 
The Supreme Court upheld the Commissioner's view, finding that the 
purpose of the tax benefit rule is not simply to tax "recoveries," but "to 
approximate the results produced by a tax system based on transactional 
rather than annual accounting" 0S-in other words, to do "transactional 
equity." 69 Thus, the tax benefit rule is triggered when a later event is 
"fundamentally inconsistent with the premise on which the deduction 
was initially based." 70 The distribution of the expensed assets was held 
to be inconsistent with the earlier deduction because the deduction was 
premised on the assumption that the grain would be consumed in the 
corporation's business. Failure to so consume it would be the same as 
selling it at a zero basis in order to recognize the gain from the re-
covery.7' Similarly, converting the asset to a nonbusiness use would be 
67 Revenue Ruling 74-396, 1974-2 C.B. 106, a progenitor of Hillsboro, applies 
the "inconsistent event" doctrine to expensed items distributed in any corporate 
liquidation governed by §§ 331, 333, or 346 (partial liquidation, the modified 
provisions of which are now in §§ 302(b) (4) and 302(e))-that is, to any liqui-
dating distribution where the shareholders take a fair market value basis (§ 331 
and 334(a)) or a substituted cost basis §§ 333 and 334(c)). In any of these 
situations, the shareholder's basis is independent of the corporation's zero basis 
in the item, and the income offset by the corporation's deduction for the item is 
forever exempted from tax unless the corporation is taxed under the tax benefit 
doctrine at the time of the distribution. 
If, however, the liquidating corporation is an 80% or more controlled sub-
sidiary of another corporation and § 332 applies, § 334(b)(1) gives the share-
holder a carryover basis and causes it to become the surrogate for recapture by 
acquiring the subsidiary's tax attributes under § 381(a)(1) and 381 (c)(12). 
Therefore, the tax benefit doctrine should not apply to the liquidating distribution 
in such a case. Revenue Ruling 74-396 so states in distinguishing a § 332 liqui-
dation which is subject to § 381, from a § 331 or § 333 liquidation. 
68 103 S. Ct. at 1142. 
69 Id. at 1146. 
70 Id. at 1143. 
71 Id. at 1150. Here the Court relies on Spitalny v. United States, 430 F.2d 195 
(9th Cir. 1970), one of a number of cases that hold that the tax benefit rule 
overrides § 337. See, e.g., Anders v. United States, 462 F.2d 1147 (Ct. Ci.) 
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Commissioner v. Anders, 414 F.2d 1283 
(10th Cir.) cert. denied, 396 U.S. 958 (1969); West Seattle Nat'l Bank v. Com-
missioner, 288 F.2d 47 (9th Cir. 1961). See also Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commis-
sioner, 103 S. Ct. at 1153 (citing Connery v. United States, 460 F.2d 1130 (3rd 
Cir. 1972); Krajeck v. United States, 75-1 U.S.T.C. ' 9492 (D.N.D. 1975); 
S.E. Evans, Inc. v. United States, 317 F. Supp. 423 (D. Ark. 1970); Estate of 
Munter v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 663 (1975)). 
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inconsistent with the prior deduction. 2 The distribution in liquidation, 
held the Court, "turns the expensed assets to the analog of personal con-
sumption." 73 
However, an inconsistent event is not enough to invoke the tax benefit 
rule, held the Court, if there is a nonrecognition provision in the pic-
ture.7 1 In such a case, there is the further question of whether the non-
recognition rule overrides the tax benefit rule. The Court held that sec-
tion 336, which provides corporate nonrecognition of gain or loss on 
the distribution of property to shareholders in liquidation, was not an 
overriding provision because it was intended only to apply to unrealized 
gains and losses, not to gain realized by a prior deduction .7 In other 
words, no double benefit (deduction and exclusion) was intended by 
Congress in enacting section 336; therefore, an exclusion in year 2 would 
have been inconsistent with the year 1 deduction. Also, a liquidation in 
year 1 would have caused denial of the deduction. 
Commissioner v. American Dental Co.: 
Tension Between Tax Benefit Rule and 
Section 102 
The Court in Hillsboro recognized that an inconsistent event in the 
context of a nonrecognition rule creates an "inherent tension" 10 between 
72 103 S. Ct. at 1150. 
73 1d. at 1150. 
74 Mager v. United States, 499 F. Supp. 37 (M.D. Pa. 1980), held that the tax 
benefit rule overrides § 1033. The court notes the tension created by the non-
recognition provision, but holds against the taxpayer without significant discussion. 
75 103 S. Ct. 1150-51. Compare Hintz v. Commissioner, 712 F.2d 281 (7th 
Cir. 1983), discussed supra note 11, where the apparent congressional intent 
embodied in 45 U.S.C. § 352(e) and (f) was to allow an exclusion for sick pay 
and unemployment insurance benefits only when they were not reimbursed by the 
employer. See also Canelo III v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 217, 226-27 (1969), 
aff'd on other grounds, 447 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1971), which held that a recovery 
of litigation costs improperly deducted in a year barred by the statute of limita-
tions was not a taxable recovery under the tax benefit rule. The tax benefit rule, 
said the Tax Court, taxes a recovery only if the initial deduction was proper. 
When it is improper, the Commissioner's remedy is to challenge the deduction 
before the year is barred. 53 T.C. at 226-27. Sections 1311 through 1314, which 
mitigate the statute of limitations, were held not to apply. Id. at 227. 
Unvert v. Commissioner, 656 F.2d 483, 486 (9th Cir. 1981), however, rejected 
Canelo and refused to recognize an improper deduction exception to the tax 
benefit rule. A deduction taken with tax benefit, whether or not proper, is all 
that is necessary, according to the Unvert court. The deduction causes the tax-
payer's entitlement to a recovery of the deducted item to lose "its nature as capi-
tal," suggesting lack of basis in the claim. Also, the erroneous deduction exception 
was held to be poor public policy because improper deductions "should not be 
rewarded," that is, should not receive treatment preferential to those taken 
properly. 
76 103 S. Ct. 1144-45, 1145 n.20. 
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the tax benefit and nonrecognition rules which can be resolved only by 
making a determination of congressional intent. The Court said: "It has 
long been accepted that a taxpayer using accrual accounting who accrues 
and deducts an expense in a tax year before it becomes payable and who 
for some reason eventually does not have to pay the liability must then 
take into account the amount of expense earlier deducted." " Because 
the deduction in such a case is obviously premised and conditioned upon 
eventual payment of the expense, the Court's conclusions as to the con-
sequences of failing to make the payment appear sound. The more diffi-
cult case arises when the liability is terminated in a nonrecognition 
transaction. 
In Commissionerv. American Dental Co.," the taxpayer accrued and 
deducted rent and interest expense and in a later year, when the taxpayer 
was fully solvent, its creditors cancelled part of the debt. The Commis-
sioner increased the taxpayer's gross income by the amount of debt dis-
charged. The Supreme Court held, however, that the forgiveness was a 
gift, "a release of something to the debtor for nothing." ' "The fact," 
said the Court, "that the motives leading to the cancellations were those 
of business or even selfish, if it be true, is not significant" so long as the 
debtor paid no consideration therefor."' 
The standard used by the Court to find a gift resembles the gift tax 
definition thereof,"' but flies in the face of the later holding of the Court 
in Commissioner v. Duberstein82 that a transfer is a gift for income tax 
purposes only if it proceeds from detached and disinterested generosity.,3 
Nevertheless, it is theoretically possible for debt discharge to arise from 
detached and disinterested generosity. 4 If the creditors in American 
Dental Co. did have that motive, the exclusion of an item previously 
deducted is not an event inconsistent with the past deduction, and, as 
that case held, the tax benefit rule is preempted by the section 102(a) 
gift exclusion. The entire transaction has the same effect as if the debt 
(interest and rent) were paid to the creditors and the proceeds were 
transferred back as a gift excludable under section 102(a). The exclu-
7 Id. at 1142. 
78 318 U.S. 322 (1943). 
7 9 1d. at 331. 
80 Id. 
81 I.R.C. § 2512(b). 
82363 U.S. 278 (1960). 
83 Indeed, the Court retreated from American Dental Co. in Commissioner v. 
Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 50 (1949), where bonds were purchased at a discount in 
an arm's length transactions, the Court holding that there was no gift within the 
predecessor of § 102(a) since the bondholder and taxpayer each pursued the best 
price that could be had.84See, e.g., Bosse v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1772 (1970); Clem v. 
Campbell, 62-2 U.S.T.C. t 9786 (N.D. Tex., 1962). 
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sion is not inconsistent with the deduction; both were intended to be 
allowed by Congress. 
Putoma Corp. v. Commissioner: Tension 
Between Tax Benefit Rule and Section 118 
A gratuitous forgiveness by a shareholder of a debt owed him by a 
corporation is a contribution to the corporation's capital, the regulations 
say, equal to the principal amount of the debt." The reference to prin-
cipal amount implies that a corporation has gross income when its share-
holder forgives interest, but the courts have rejected this distinction. In 
PutomaCorp. v. Commissioner,86 the corporation accrued and deducted 
interest owed to its 50% shareholder, and in a later year the shareholder 
forgave the interest debt. The court found there was a contribution to 
capital even as to forgiven and previously deducted interest.8 7 Therefore, 
under section 118(a), which generally excludes contributions to capital 
from corporate income, the cancellation of the interest was not gross in-
come to the corporation, and the tax benefit rule could not apply. The 
court also held that under the Supreme Court's decision in American 
Dental, the discharge of the debt was excluded by section 102 as a gift. 
The result appears manifestly correct since if the corporation had paid 
the interest and received the payment back as a capital contribution, the 
cash receipt would be excluded by section 118, and the deduction for the 
interest would not have been affected. Congress intends this result, and 
there is no inconsistency with the past deduction. Nevertheless, section 
108(e) (6), added in 1980,18 reversed Putoma by requiring an accrual 
method corporation to recognize debt discharge income when accrued 
interest is forgiven by a cash method shareholder.a9 
Section 108 (e) (6) apparently derives from a dissatisfaction with the 
Putoma court's treatment of the shareholder." The government argued 
alternatively in the Tax Court in Putoma that if the corporation were 
not to be taxed on the discharge, the shareholder should be because the 
85 Reg. § 1.61-12(a). 
86 601 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1979). 
s Accord Hartland Associates v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1580 (1970) (citing 
American Dental Co. v. Commissioner, 318 U.S. 322 (1943)); Commissioner v. 
Auto Strop Safety Razor Co., 74 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'g 28 B.T.A. 621 
(1933); McConway &Torley Corp. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 593 (1943); George 
Hall Corp. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 146 (1943)).
88 Pub. L. No. 96-589, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 3389, 3393 (1980). 
89 More specifically, the rule is that when a shareholder contributes a corporate 
debt to the corporation's capital, (1) the corporation is treated as having satisfied 
the debt for a cash payment equal to the shareholder's basis for the debt and (2) 
the excess of the debt over the shareholder's basis is income from discharge of 
indebtedness that is not excluded from gross income by § 118. 
90 S. REP. No. 1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1980). 
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corporate deduction should be matched with shareholder gross income.01 
The Service lost in the Tax Court on this point and appealed, but the 
appeal was later dismissed by the Fifth Circuit at the government's re-
quest.9 2 The government apparently followed the advice of the Tax 
Court "to seek symmetry in another forum." 0 The apparent effect of 
section 108(e) (6) is to give that symmetry, to make the exclusion of 
section 118 inapplicable so that the corporation is taxed on the dis-. 
charge. Although the shareholder apparently avoids tax, he seemingly 
does also not get an upwards basis adjustment for his stock. 
Section 108(e) (6) is wrong-headed and short-sighted. It is wrong-
headed because it deems an event (a contribution to capital) to be what 
it is not, turning an event with economic reality into an unreal event in 
order to collect a tax. 4 It is short-sighted in many respects. 
First, the provision is not integrated with section 267(a) (2), which 
denies an accrual method corporation's deduction for interest owed to a 
greater than 50% shareholder if the shareholder uses the cash method 
and the interest is not paid within two and one-half months after the 
close of the year in which the interest accrues. Since section 108 (e) (6) 
literally does not require a deduction, the effect of the two sections may 
be to both deny the interest deduction to the corporation under section 
267(a)(2) and charge the corporation with debt discharge income 
under section 108 (e) (6). 
Second, section 108(e) (6) might possibly be avoided if the share-
holder takes back stock equal in value to the amount discharged because 
the provision states only that "section 118 shall not apply" and it is sec-
tion 1032(a) that excludes from gross income the consideration received 
on an issue of stock. If the shareholder takes back stock, furthermore, 
the transaction is not the same as in Putoma because there a 50% share-
holder forgave interest due him without taking back stock, thereby shift-
ing one half of the benefit of the discharge to other shareholders. There-
fore, it would be difficult to equate a discharge in exchange for stock 
with Putoma in order to invoke section 108(e) (6), unless the share-
holder owned 100% of the stock. 
Third, suppose the corporation in fact paid the interest to the share-
holder and the shareholder returned the payment as a contribution to 
capital. This transaction does not fall literally within section 108(e) (6) 
since it is not the "indebtedness" which is contributed to capital. Never-
91 66 T.C. at 669-72. 
92 601 F.2d at 741. 
93 66 T.C. at 671. 
9- See, e.g., I.R.C. § 636, discussed in Joyce & DelCotto, The AB (ABC) and 
BA Transactions: An Economic and Tax Analysis of Reserved and Carved-Out 
Income Interests, 31 TAx L. REv. 121, 156-162, 179-182 (1976). 
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theless, would the step transaction doctrine collapse the two steps into 
a debt discharge subject to section 108(e) (6)? It should not, since the 
payment of the interest would give the shareholder interest income, and 
section 108(e) (6) seems designed only to compensate for the lack of a 
shareholder tax. If the step transaction doctrine is not applied, however, 
taxpayers are offered a choice between a corporate tax (the result of a 
contribution of the debt) and a tax on shareholders (the consequence of 
a payment of the interest followed by a contribution of the payment). 
Is it wise to give such a choice? 
Fourth, section 108(e) (6) invokes the debt discharge rules rather 
than the tax benefit rule to tax the corporation. Although we argue 
below that these rules operate in the same way and for the same reasons, 
there is a great deal of confusion about the relationship between them." 
It might not be seen that part or all of the corporate interest deduction 
is within the recovery exclusion of section 111 .9 
There is a further problem. The Senate Finance Report says that the 
Putoma result should not be reached on the alternative ground that the 
shareholder made a gift to the corporation since "it is intended" that 
there will not be any gift exclusion in a commercial context to the gen-
eral rule that debt discharge gives rise to income."7 This attempt to 
amend section 102 by committee report rather than by statute is doubly 
strange in that the attempt is made in the report on section 108, a most 
unlikely place for it.98 Also, the attempted amendment is the very posi-
tion of the government which was rejected by the Supreme Court in 
1 °° Commissioner v. Duberstein9 9 and discussed at length in Putoma. 
95 See generally Putoma v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 652 (1976); BITTKER, supra 
note 63, at 6.4.5. 
96 Rev. Rul. 67-200, 1967-1 C.B. 15; Rev. Rul. 70-406, 1970-2 C.B. 16. See 
generally BITTKER, supranote 63, at para. 6.4.5. n.71. 
97 S. REP. No. 1035, supra note 90, at 19. The Putona opinion uses §§ 118 
and 102 as alternative grounds for the corporate exclusion, but it is not clear that 
§ 102 was not independently necessary because the forgiving shareholder did not 
take back stock in exchange for the discharge, and the discharge thus benefited 
the other 50% shareholder. 
98 Compare H.R. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 545 (1980) (Conf. Rep.) 
(committee report on § 302(c)(2)(C), which allows entities the benefit of the 
attribution waiver provided by § 302(c) (2) (A), states that the statute is intended 
to overrule Rickey v. United States, 592 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir. 1979)). See also 
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL 
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, at 153-54 (1976), reprintedin 
1976-3 (vol. 2) C.B. 166 (committee report pertaining to the repeal of § 422, 
relating to qualified stock options, states congressional intent with respect to the 
future application of § 83 although nothing in the statute amended § 83 in any 
way.) 
90 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
100 601 F.2d at 748. 
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Apparently, what the government does not get in the courts or statutes, 
it takes by committee report. 
Even if the attempted amendment is given effect, a debt discharge 
given to an accrual method, noncorporate business debtor appears still 
to be within the rule of Putoma if the discharge is a gift within the dis-
interested generosity test of Duberstein. Assume a sole proprietor bor-
rows money from an unrelated friend to by business assets, and accrues 
and deducts the interest on the loan; the friend subsequently forgives the 
interest as a gift. There is no reason why the taxpayer should not have 
both the deduction and the exclusion. 10' The gift does not arise from a 
commercial relationship. The gift exclusion is not inconsistent with the 
prior interest deduction. 
Reimbursement Doctrine 
Another aspect of the deduction-exclusion problem is illustrated by 
tax-free reimbursements of items that would otherwise be deductible. In 
Manocchio v. Commissioner,"0 2 the taxpayer took a flight training course 
and deducted the entire cost as educational expense allowable under sec-
tion 1.162-5 of the regulations. As a veteran, the taxpayer was entitled 
to an allowance of 90% of the cost under veterans' assistance legisla-
tion. This allowance is exempted by statute from tax.1 13 The allowance 
was paid to the taxpayer during the year that he incurred and deducted 
the cost. The Tax Court denied 90% of the deduction under section 
265(1), on the ground that that portion of the expense was "allocable 
to" the tax-exempt reimbursement."0 4 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, agree-
ing that 90% of the cost was nondeductible, but relying instead on the 
principle that an otherwise deductible expense cannot be deducted if it is 
reimbursed. The rationale for the reimbursement theory is that to the 
extent of reimbursement, there has been no expense."' 
101 In this situation, the forgiveness of the debt for accrued interest (even 
though accompanied by a forgiveness of the principal) should require the friend-
creditor to include the accrued interest in income under assignment of income 
principles. Smith's Estate v. Commissioner, 292 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1961). This 
is the alternative argument made by the government in Putoma, an argument 
rejected by the Tax Court, and abandoned in appeal to the Fifth Circuit-all of 
which led to the enactment of § 108(e) (6). See supranote 94 and accompanying 
text. 
102 710 F.2d 1400 (9th Cir. 1983). 
10332 U.S.C. § 3101(a) (1976), which states: "Payments of benefits . . . 
under any law administered by the Veterans' Administration ... shall be exempt 
from taxation." 
104 78 T.C. 989, 992-96 (1982), aff'd, 710 F.2d 1400 (9th Cir. 1983). The 
relationship of § 265(1) to the deduction-exclusion problem is discussed infra at 
notes 153-57 and accompanying text. 
105 710 F.2d at 1402. 
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The same result obtained in Banks v. Commissioner,10 where the 
Veterans Administration paid the taxpayer's tuition and book expenses 
directly. The payments were tax exempt to taxpayer, and this exemption, 
the Tax Court held, precluded a deduction. "No income was taxed which 
was devoted to the expense." 107 This reasoning seems to have basis im-
plications; that is, since the expense was paid with zero basis dollars, 
there is no tax deduction. But the court also said that there was no ex-
pense from a tax standpoint.' This is the reimbursement theory of 
Manocchio. The Tax Court further stated that the disallowance was 
necessary to prevent the "effect" of giving the taxpayer a "double deduc-
tion for one item," 109 meaning, apparently, a deduction plus an exclu-
sion. 
The taxpayer in Wolfers v. Commissioner... was reimbursed for re-
location expenses under a federal statute which provided that the 
reimbursement was not to be "considered as income." The Tax Court 
held that the reimbursed expenses were not deductible, relying in part 
upon Charles Baloian Co. v. Commissioner,' which also held that a 
tax-exempt relocation reimbursement prevented a moving expense deduc-
tion. 
These reimbursement cases could also be analyzed with the approach 
suggested in Hillsboro. The question could be asked, "Is an exclusion 
for the reimbursement inconsistent with the deduction?" If so, and if the 
expenditure is reimbursed in the year it is made or there then exists a 
reasonable claim for reimbursement, there should be no deduction, as 
1 1 2 noted in Hillsboro. On the other hand, if the recovery is in a later 
year, the proper relief is to treat the recovery as gross income up to the 
amount of the past deduction." 3 
106 17 T.C. 1386 (1952). 
107 Id. at 1393. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 69 T.C. 975, 981 (1978) (construing 42 U.S.C. § 4636 (1976)). 
111 68 T.C. 620 (1977), nonacq., reviewed (1 dis.). 
112 103 S. Ct. 1134, 1146 (1983). See also Spitalny v. United States, 403 F.2d 
195, 198 (9th Cir. 1970); Anders v. United States, 462 F.2d 1147, 1149 (Ct. 
Cl.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Rev. Rul. 71-160, 1971-1 C.B. 75; 
Reg. § 1.165-1(d) (2) (i). Apparently, the courts do not distinguish between cash 
method and accrual method taxpayers, even though there is an argument that 
accrual of a right to later reimbursement should not prevent a deduction to a 
cash method taxpayer. Canelo v. Commissioner, 447 F.2d 484, 485 (9th Cir. 
1971) (citing Burnett v. Commissioner, 356 F.2d 755 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
385 U.S. 832 (1966), and Hearn v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 431 (9th Cir. 1962), 
cert. denied, 373 U.S. 909 (1963)). 
113 Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 103 S. Ct. at 1140 n.10; Reg. § 
1.165-1(d) (2)(iii); Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399 
(Ct. Cl. 1967); Rev. Rul. 71-160, 1971-1 C.B. 75. See also the position of the 
Commissioner in Charles Baloian Co. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 620 (1977). 
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review 
19841 TAX BENEFIT RULE 497 
Under the tax benefit rule, then, the underlying question raised by the 
reimbursement doctrine, where the reimbursement is tax exempt, is 
whether the reimbursement is inconsistent with allowance of the deduc-
tion. To put it another way, does denial of the deduction thwart any 
congressional policy with respect to the exclusion? Denial of the deduc-
tion leaves the taxpayer in much the same economic position as an allow-
ance of the deduction and a denial of the exclusion for the reimburse-
ment. The Tax Court noted this in Manocchido, but said that denial of 
deduction did not abrogate the veteran's tax exemption of the flight train-
ing benefit."' Apparently, the court thought the deduction and exclu-
sion issues were not tied because not all expenses subject to reimburse-
ment could be deducted with tax benefit in the absence of reimbursement; 
some educational costs do not qualify for deduction, and some reim-
bursed taxpayers do not have sufficient itemized deductions to take ad-
vantage of an available deduction. 
This, however, is only to say that some veterans have the exclusion 
and some do not. Those who are denied a deduction are effectively 
denied the exclusion because the effect of the denial of the deduction is 
the same as allowing the deduction and taxing the reimbursement. In 
any event, those who have no deduction receive the exclusion. In 
Manocchio, the recovery was, by federal statute, "exempt from taxation," 
and it is not enough to say the exemption is preserved if it is preserved 
haphazardly, for some but not all taxpayers. Nor is it enough to say, as 
the court did in Wolfers, that the exemption statute was drafted by com-
mittees of Congress not familiar with tax legislation, or that the statute 
involved was not couched in the traditional "exclusion" language of 
Code." 5 
If Congress intends a permanent exclusion, the taxpayer must have a 
basis for the excluded receipt equal to its fair market value, and any 
expense paid with the property so received must be deductible if it falls 
within a deduction rule, applied without regard to the receipt. To hold 
-as did Mannocchio and the other cases discussed above-that the re-
imbursement makes the expense nondeductible is equivalent to holding 
that the property received takes a zero basis; when there is no basis, non-
taxation of the receipt is merely a deferral. The effect is the same as re-
ceiving a gift of property having a zero basis to the donor. When the 
property is sold, its value when given becomes income, and the combina-
114 78 T.C. at 997. The point was also raised in Wolfers, but was not discussed 
by the Tax Court. 
115 69 T.C. at 982. The statute said: "No payment received ... shall be con-
sidered as income for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954." See supra 
note 118. 
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tion of sections 102(a) (exclusion) and 1015(a) (carryover basis) re-
suits in only deferral. If the same property is inherited, the section 102 
exclusion is truly that because section 1014(a) gives permanent relief 
from tax through a fair market value basis. Certainly, one who receives 
a check for tax-free municipal bond interest and endorses it over to pay 
his real estate taxes has both an exclusion (section 103) and a deduction 
(section 164) because section 103 is truly an exclusion section and not 
a deferral section. It gives tax-free basis.1 " 
It appears, then, that when Congress wants an exclusion to be only a 
deferral, it attaches a basis section so indicating. The combinations of 
sections 109 and 1019, 108 and 1017, 1031 (a) and (d), and 1034(a) 
and (e) have this effect. This list is not exhaustive, but it illustrates 
clearly that an excluded amount of cash must have a full basis unless 
Congress says otherwise. Without basis, there is deferral, not exclusion. 
Thus, the language in the Banks opinion intimating lack of basis in the 
dollars recovered is erroneous. And, the "double deduction" observation 
fails to see that double benefits are permitted where intended by Con-
gress. In Manocchio, the Tax Court makes another exclusion rule func-
tion only as a deferral rule. 
The deduction is denied, the court said in Manocchio, "where, but for 
the expense, there would simply be no exempt income," 7 in other 
words, where the payment is earmarked for the expense. But, suppose 
a parent makes a gift to a child to allow the child to pay for advanced 
schooling, the cost of which is deductible. A similar problem was ad-
dressed by the Tax Court in Shanahan v. Commissioner,"" where the 
taxpayers received a loan from the Small Business Administration to 
repair their home, which had been damaged by an earthquake. In the 
same year, a portion of the loan obligation was cancelled under the 
Disaster Relief Act of 1970. The taxpayers argued the cancellation was 
a gift, exempt under section 102(a), and was not compensation for the 
loss within the meaning of the provision of section 165 (a), which makes 
nondeductible any loss "compensated for by insurance or otherwise." 
The Tax Court found no detached and disinterested generosity on the 
part of the government, but rather a sense of obligation. Therefore, the 
116 Also, § 705(a) (1) (B) steps up the basis of a partnership interest for a 
partner's share of tax-exempt income of the partnership. The addition to basis 
made is so that the benefit of such tax-exempt income will not be lost to the 
parties. Otherwise, the partner would eventually incur a capital gains tax with re-
spect to these amounts. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 324-25 (1954). 
Accord S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 384 (1954). The partner thus has 
both an exclusion and a deduction, that is, a basis offset in a sale under § 1001. 
"1778 T.C. at 994. 
118 63 T.C. 21 (1974). 
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debt discharge was held to be compensation which reduced the taxpayers' 
casualty loss deduction.119 
In contrast, Revenue Ruling 64-329 120 held that a gift to an unin-
sured disaster victim by relatives and neighbors was not compensation 
and did not reduce the casualty loss deduction, even though the funds 
received were used to repair the damage. The ruling distinguished Reve-
nue Ruling 131,121 which held a transfer by an employer to employee 
disaster victims was compensation since there the money received had to 
be used for repairs. In Revenue Ruling 64-329, on the other hand, 
"there was no limitation or directive relating to the manner in which the 
money was to be used by the recipient." 1'2 2 This is the test applied by 
1 2'the Tax Court in Manocchio. 
No Deduction for Items Previously Excluded 
Sections 1032, 118, and 362(c) 
A leading Supreme Court case illustrating this principle is Detroit 
Edison Co. v. Commissioner.24 The taxpayer had excluded from gross 
income as capital contributions payments received from nonshare-
holders. 12 The Court held that the basis of the assets acquired with the 
payments was zero because the taxpayer had no "cost" for the property. 
In other words, the corporation could not acquire a basis for future de-
preciation deductions when none of its cost had been included in gross 
income. 12 6 Since 1954, this principle has been codified as section 362(c). 
Section 362(c), however, is an exception to the general rule. Section 
362(a) provides that if property is received from a shareholder as a con-
tribution to capital or in exchange for stock or securities in a transaction 
encompassed by the shareholder nonrecognition rule of section 351, the 
corporation's basis for it is the sum of the shareholders' basis and any 
gain he recognized on the transfer. If property is received in exchange 
119 Id. at 26. Accord Rev. Rul. 71-160, 1971-1 C.B. 75. Cf. Rev. Rul. 55-
609, 1955-2 C.B. 34, where the authorizing statute characterized a payment as a 
gift.
120 1964-2 C.B. 58. 
121 1953-2 C.B. 112. 
1.22 1964-2 C.B. 58-59. 
123 See also Christian v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. La. 1962), 
where the taxpayer received an exempt scholarship and an exempt gift from a 
friend to defray her otherwise deductible travel expense, and the court denied the 
deduction under § 265(1) because, in a strange twist, the taxpayer admitted that 
the expense was "allocable to" the gift and fellowship award. 
124 319 U.S. 98 (1943). 
125 The payments were thought to be tax exempt under Edwards v. Cuba R.R., 
265 U.S. 28 (1925). 
126 Accord United States v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 412 U.S. 401 (1973); 
Wolfers v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 975 (1978). 
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review 
500 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39: 
for stock and the nonrecognition rule of section 351 does not apply to 
the shareholder, the corporation takes a basis equal to the fair market 
value of the property.' 27 The corporation recognizes no income or gain 
on the receipt of property from shareholders, whether the property is re-
ceived in exchange for stock or as a capital contribution. 128 Thus, when 
property is received from shareholders, a corporation has an exclusion 
and also acquires a basis to support future deductions. 
Farid-Es-Sultaneh 
Suppose a husband discharges his wife's debt to her doctor for medical 
services. The wife has received a payment for support, which is exclud-
able to her, 129 and she also has a medical deduction because she acquires 
a full basis in the support payment. The basis issue was litigated in 
Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner.3 ' There, stock acquired in ex-
change for a release of support and dower rights 131 was held to have 
been acquired by purchase and to have taken a basis equal to its fair 
market value when acquired. If Farid-Es-Sultaneh had immediately 
used this stock to pay her medical bills, she would have had a medical 
deduction, subject to the usual limitations, and would have realized no 
gain. Thus, we have the phenomenon of exclusion and deduction for the 
same item. The deduction is not an event inconsistent with the exclusion 
because such is the intent of existing law. 
132 
127 Reg. § 1.1032-1(d). See Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Commissioner, 
44 T.C. 745, 762 (1965), appeal dismissed pursuant to stipulation (2d Cir. July 
19, 1967) (cost of assets is fair market value of stock issued to acquire assets). 
See also Rev. Rul. 62-217, 1962-2 C.B. 59 (corporation distributing shares of 
treasury stock having a value above basis as compensation to employees for ser-
vices rendered has a deductible business expense equal to the fair market value 
of the stock despite the nonrecognition of gain provisions of § 1032(a)). Com-
pare International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 
1943) (shares of taxpayer's corporate shareholder used to pay compensation; fair 
market value deduction allowable, but appreciation in stock taxable as gain). 
Accord United States v. General Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. 
denied, 365 U.S. 843 (1961); Tasty Baking Co. v. United States, 393 F.2d 992 
(Ct. CI. 1968). 
128 I.R.C. §§ 118(a) (contributions to capital), 1032(a) (receipt of property 
in exchange for stock). 
129 Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917) (alimony not gross income); Smith 
v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939) (dictum); Rev. Rul. 55-457, 1955-2 
C.B. 527. 
130 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947). 
131 Amounts received for dower rights are also not income. Rev. Rut. 67-221, 
1967-2 C.B. 63. See also United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 73 n.7 (1962). 
132 Compare §422 of the Tax Reform Act of 1984, which adds a new § 1041 to 
the Code making nontaxable a transfer of property between spouses or incident to 
divorce and giving the transferee a carryover rather than cost basis. 
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A similar result should occur when a husband is required by a divorce 
decree to pay his divorced wife's legal fees. The husband is not entitled 
to a deduction for the payment: Section 215 (the deduction for ali-
mony) does not apply because the payment is a noncontingent, one time 
payment that fails the requirement of periodicity, nor is it within section 
212(3)."'1 But, the question has not been resolved by the courts as to 
whether she can deduct it, for example, under section 212(3). Since the 
direct payment by the husband to the lawyer is economically the same 
as a payment to his wife, who in turn pays her lawyer, the wife should 
have the deduction. The wife's receipt of the payment (directly or in-
directly) is not gross income to her because it is nonperiodic support 
and outside of section 71, but this exclusion should not prevent the de-
duction since the intended effect of sections 71 and 212(3) is to give 
her an exclusion for her nonperiodic support ,1"and a deduction for a 
lawyer's tax advice. To deny the deduction because of the exclusion 
would be an implicit overruling of Farid-Es-Sultaneh. Neither should 
the results be affected by the fact that the funds constructively received 
5by her are earmarked for support.
1 3 
Statutory Provisions 
As already noted in the discussion of deduction-exclusion issues, when 
Congress wants deferral instead of exclusion, it knows how to say so 
through basis provisions preventing full value basis. This holds true in 
the exclusion-deduction area also. Section 109, for example, excludes 
133 United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 74-75 (1962) (deduction for tax ad-
vice claimed by husband under § 212(3) disallowed since the deducted amount 
was a payment of a fee incurred by wife for tax advice to her); Rose v. Com-
missioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 644 (1971) (essentially same facts; no § 215 de-
duction because not periodic). Accord Curley v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1798 (1974); Johnson v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 580 (1971).
34 Barnett v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 25 (1974) (payments of at-
torneys fees are support payments), rev'd on other grounds, 75-2 U.S.T.C. ' 9513 
(1Oth Cir. 1975). 
135 Section 71 was significantly revised in 1984, but this result was not changed. 
Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 103 S. Ct. 1134, 1148 n.28 (1983), re-
fers to another exclusion-deduction situation. Assume a corporation pays a 
state tax owed by a shareholder. If the corporation has ample earnings and 
profits, the payment is a constructive dividend, and, in the absence of a statutory 
exclusion, the shareholder has gross income equal to the corporate payment on 
his behalf. If the tax would have been deductible had the shareholder paid it 
directly, the Court says, he should be allowed a deduction for the corporation's 
payment of it. In this case, the shareholder has gross income and deduction in 
offsetting amounts. Section 116, however, provides a limited exclusion of divi-
dends from gross income (presently $200). If the constructive dividend in the 
example is within the exclusion, the Court implies, the shareholder has both an 
exclusion and a deduction for the same item. 
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from a lessor's gross income the value of permanent improvements made 
by a lessee if the improvements are made for the lessee's own use and 
not as rent in kind. Section 1019, however, gives the lessor a zero basis 
for the improvements. The lessor thus cannot depreciate the improve-
ments, and any amount received for the improvements on a sale of the 
property is gain. Therefore, the exclusion operates as a deferral."' 0 
When no such basis provision is present, especially for cash receipts, ex-
clusion-deduction is the logical outcome. 137 
No Double Exclusion 
We have used United States v. Kirby Lumber Co. 3" to show that a 
borrower cannot exclude both the borrowing and a later discharge of the 
debt.139 It is possible, nevertheless, to have double exclusions under 
Commissioner v. American DentalCo. 4 ' where the principal amount of 
a debt (rather than expensed interest) is discharged by gift."' We sub-
mit that Kirby Lumber is properly viewed as an application of the tax 
benefit principle.' 42 A second exclusion (exclusion of the discharge) 
would be inconsistent with the first exclusion (exclusion of the borrow-
ing) because the first was given on condition the debt be paid. 
Under this view, it is arguable that a nongratuituous debt discharge 
can be excluded under the exclusionary branch of the tax benefit rule if 
exclusion of the earlier borrowing did not give tax benefit. Suppose a 
taxpayer borrows $100 in a year when a $100 net operating loss carry-
over is about to expire, but he has enough deductions without the carry-
over to give him zero taxable income. The exclusion of the borrowing 
gives him no tax benefit because if the borrowing were included, the 
136 Another illustration is the combination of § 108(a), which excludes from 
gross income certain income from discharge from indebtedness, and § 108(b) (2) 
(D), (b) (5), and (c) (1) (A), which sometimes require the excluded amounts to be 
applied in reduction of the taxpayer's basis for his property. See also I.R.C. § 1017. 
137 For example, §§ 102/1014, 103, 104 (with an exception for prior medical 
deductions), 105, 106, and 112-132 (excluding §§ 126 and 127 because of 8 
126(d) and (e) and § 127(c) (7) preventing both exclusion and deduction).
138 284 U.S. 1 (1931). 
139 Recognition of the income on discharge is sometimes deferred by §§ 108 
and 1017. See supra note 136. 
140 318 U.S. 322 (1943). 
141 Supra note 91. 
142 See Commissioner v. Tufts, 103 S. Ct. 1826, 1832 n.8 (1983). Contra 
BrrTKER, supra note 63, at 6.4.6 (arguing that a Kirby Lumber inclusion of 
debt discharge does not depend on a prior tax benefit); Plumb, The Tax Benefit 
Rule Today, 57 HARv. L. REV. 129, 144 n.61 (1943) (arguing that the tax benefit 
rule is inapplicable to Kirby Lumber because of the absence of a prior deduc-
tion). See also Rev. Rul. 70-406, 1970-2 C.B. 16 (applying the § 111 recovery 
exclusion to a discharge of accrued interest); Rev. Rul. 67-200, 1967-1 C.B. 15. 
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' carryover would prevent any of it from being taxable income." Thus, 
a later discharge, even if not gratuitous, is arguably within the recovery 
exclusion allowed by section 111 and the regulations thereunder. 
A last example involves section 121. If a home is acquired in an ex-
cludable manner, by gift, for example, a sale fitting the gain forgiveness 
provisions of section 121 (sale by one age 55 or over of property used 
for the prescribed period as the taxpayer's principal residence) results in 
a second exclusion. 
Part M 
Role of Section 265(1) 
In Manocchio v. Commissioner,144 section 265(1) was construed by 
the Tax Court to deny a deduction, otherwise allowable, because the 
source of the claimed deduction was excluded from gross income. The 
taxpayer, a veteran reporting on the cash method, had been reimbursed 
for educational costs which he paid during the same year for a flight 
training program. The Commissioner agreed that these educational costs 
would ordinarily have been deductible under section 162. Nevertheless, 
he denied them because the veteran's grant, by the statute under which 
the grant was made, was "exempt from taxation." 145 Thus, argued the 
Commissioner, the deduction was "allocable" to a class "of income 
wholly exempt" and could not be deducted under section 265(1). 
The taxpayer, relying on the legislative history of section 265(1), 
contended that it applied only to deductions related to "the production" 
143 If the carryover was not about to expire, the borrowing exclusion presum-
ably would give tax benefit since it preserves the carryover for future years, al-
though the analysis is a bit muddy if the carryover persists into the year of the 
discharge. Section 1.111-1(b) (2) of the regulations defines the recovery exclu-
sion as "the portion of the... deductions... which could be disallowed without 
causing an increase in any tax of the taxpayer" and says that "consideration must 
be given to the effect of net operating loss carryovers and carrybacks." Section 
111(d) says that a deduction which causes "an increase in a carryover which has 
not expired shall be treated as a reduction in tax," that is, as a deduction which 
could not be disallowed in any part without increasing tax. In our example, the 
exclusion prevents a decrease in a carryover. If the carryover is a carryover to 
the year of the discharge, it should be deemed to have reduced tax for purposes 
of § 111(d). See S. REP. No. 1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1980). This report 
clears up the ambiguity in the statute as to the meaning of "not expired." The 
deduction must increase a carryover that had not expired at the end of the taxable 
year when the recovery occurs. In our example, the carryover expires prior to 
the recovery year, and so the exclusion does not cause a reduction in tax. Obvi-
ously, a recovery in the next year could not be offset by the lapsed carryover. 
144 78 T.C. 989 (1982), aff'd on othergrounds, 710 F.2d 1400 (9th Cir. 1983). 
The same approach is taken by the Commissioner in Revenue Ruling 83-3, 
1983-1 C.B. 72. 
145 38 U.S.C. § 3101 (1982). 
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of tax-exempt income and that the tax exempt nature of the source of the 
deduction was irrelevant. The Tax Court rejected the taxpayer's con-
tention stating: 
We agree with the petitioner that if the income derived from his employ-
ment as a commercial pilot were tax-exempt, and his educational expenses 
were not reimbursed by the VA, the flight-training deduction would be 
allocable to such income for purposes of section 265(1). We do not 
agree, however, that the deduction is permanently locked into his employ-
ment income where the expenses are also subject to exempt reimburse-
ment. In that situation, we think the proximate one-for-one relationship 
between the reimbursement and the deduction overrides the underlying 
relationship between the deduction and the employment income, leaving 
the deduction "directly allocable," as that term is used in section 1.265-
1(c), Income Tax Regs., solely to the reimbursement and to no other class 
of income.
14 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Fay attempted to soften the majority's 
approach, refusing to read it as denying a deduction where the source of 
the payment was tax exempt: 
I agree petitioner's claimed deduction is disallowed by section 265(1). 
However, I disagree with any implication that we are deciding section 
265(1) applies to expenses paid out of exempt income as well as to ex-
penses incurred in the production of exempt income. 
In a reimbursement situation such as the one presented herein, the ex-
pense may be said to have produced the exempt income simply because, if 
the expense had not been incurred, there would not have been any exempt 
income. 14
7 
Whatever the merits of the distinction drawn by Judge Fay, the simplest 
and, in our opinion, most accurate reaction to Manocchio is that it 
broadens section 265(1) beyond its purpose. Fairly read, especially in 
light of its legislative history, 4 ' section 265(1) is unconcerned with the 
source of the payment claimed as a deduction. To be sure, the crucial 
word of section 265 (1) -"allocable"--admits of both a source and pro-
duction purpose, but it seems clear that this is not what Congress had 
in mind. 
In support of this proposition, one could point to the companion pro-
vision of section 265(2), which prohibits a deduction for interest on 
loans made or continued to purchase tax exempt bonds. Without ques-
tion, this provision speaks only to the question of the production of tax 
exempt income. 
146 78 T.C. at 995. 
147 ld. at 1003. 
148 d at 993 n.4. 
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One could also point to the haphazard manner in which the Tax 
Court's analysis operates. Suppose taxpayer A's parent gives him cash 
with no strings attached and A thereafter uses the money to pay for 
otherwise deductible education, whereas taxpayer B's parent reimburses 
her for the costs of a particular educational course. Can we attribute to 
Congress an intent to allow A a deduction, but disallow the deduction to 
the B? The Tax Court's earmarking approach in Manocchio would draw 
this distinction. 
In the final analysis, however, the main objection to the Tax Court's 
approach to section 265(1) is that it precludes analysis of, by assuming 
the answer to, the question whether Congress intended to preclude any 
deduction for an expense paid with funds received tax free. The un-
analyzed assumption of both the Commissioner and the Tax Court in 
Manocchio is that Congress intended that section 265(1) always bar 
this double benefit. 
Actually, section 265(1) can be seen to emanate from a different ob-
jective: to disallow deductions of the costs of producing tax-exempt in-
come so that such costs are allocated only to exempt rather than taxable 
income. This objective is completely consistent with allowing a double 
benefit when tax exempt income is used to pay a deductible expense. 
Suppose T receives $10 in salary and $10 in interest exempted by section 
103, and pays a $10 investment fee directly related to the interest. If 
the interest were includable in gross income, 7"s taxable income would 
be $10, an amount equal to his salary, because he has no net income 
from interest. The exemption of the interest is not intended to allow T 
to pay less tax than he would have if he had had no interest income at 
all. Without section 265(1), however, T's taxable income would be 
zero because the investment expense, incurred solely to produce the in-
terest, would be deducted from the salary. Section 265 (1) is thus needed 
to bar deduction of the expenses of earning tax-exempt income so that 
the exclusion of the income does no more than exempt it alone from tax. 
In effect, section 265(1), as noted above, requires matching tax-exempt 
receipts with the cost of producing them. Without section 265 (1), sec-
tion 103 would, in effect, cause a second $10 exclusion through a de-
duction of the costs against taxable income. Thus, section 265(), as 
applied to expenses in producing tax-exempt income, is not a retreat from 
the congressional policies exempting the income. In the example, (1) 
the cost of earning tax-exempt income is not permitted to be deducted 
against taxable income, and (2) the section 103 exclusion is in no way 
thwarted. This is so because, even without section 103, there would only 
be $10 of salary income, both economically and from a tax position. 
Assume, in contrast, that T has $10 of salary income, pays $10 for 
educational expenses that maintain skills used in his employment, and 
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receives reimbursement of this expense from the government under a 
statute specifying that the reimbursement is tax exempt. If T had not 
received the reimbursement, his taxable income would have been zero. 
With the reimbursement, the result is the same if the reimbursement does 
not bar the deduction. If the reimbursement makes the expense non-
deductible, however, taxable income is $10. Allowance of the deduction 
does not reduce taxable income to less than what it would have been if 
no tax exempt income had been received. Denial of the deduction, on 
the other hand, makes taxable income greater than it would have been 
in the absence of the tax-exempt reimbursement, and thus improperly 
takes away the benefit of the tax exemption. 
Another example may help to clarify this analysis. Suppose T earns 
$10 of salary and pays it to a lawyer in order to obtain $10 of exempt 
tuition assistance under a program for veterans. He then uses the $10 
of the benefits to pay tuition ordinarily deductible under section 162. 
When he completes the education, his employer pays him a bonus of $10 
in recognition of his increased ability and earning capacity. 
The lawyer's fee paid with the salary is clearly not deductible because 
under section 265(1) it is the cost of producing tax exempt veteran's 
benefits. After payment of this fee, T has no net economic gain from 
the $10 of exempt benefits. The use of the exempt benefits to pay tuition, 
however, would also cause the Tax Court in Manocchio to disallow tu-
ition expense as a deduction because the exempt benefits are the source 
of the otherwise deductible payment. The net effect of this construction 
of section 265(1) is to produce $20 of taxable income, even though 
there is only $10 of economic gain."49 The reason for this is the use of 
both the cost of production rule and the source rule to allow one exempt 
item of $10 to deny two deductions totalling $20. 
Of course, in many cases, like Manocchio, there is no outlay to pro-
duce the tax-exempt benefit; that is, no outlay such as the attorney's fee 
in our last hypothetical. The result of the Manocchio construction in 
these cases is not to deny two claimed deductions because of one exclu-
sion (since only one deduction is being claimed), but rather to deny the 
exclusion of the veteran's benefit by denying the educational expense 
deduction under section 265(1). If, for example, we removed the $10 
of salary and the $10 attorney's fee in our last hypothetical, Manocchio 
would still result in $10 of taxable income. While it is true that there is 
149 That is, $10 salary, plus $10 veteran's benefits, plus $10 bonus, minus $10 
attorney's fee, minus $10 tuition payment. The bonus is part of the illustration 
to highlight the fact that the educational expense is really a cost of producing 
taxable income. The same analysis would apply absent the bonus since then the 
benefit becomes the cost of future taxable income to be earned by the education 
obtained. 
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a bonus of $10, that bonus does not represent any economic gain be-
cause there was $10 of cost (the tuition payment) required to produce 
it. The effect of Manocchio is to tax the veteran's benefit and therefore 
deny the exclusion. 
In summary, the Tax Court's approach to section 265(1) in Manocchio 
is unsupported by legislative history, and is haphazard in its operation. 
In some situations, it causes taxable income to exceed economic gain. In 
other situations, without any real analysis of the issue, congressional ex-
clusionary policies are rendered subservient to the policy of accurately 
reflecting economic gain, an approach which is, at bottom, antithetical 
to the Supreme Court's enlightened approach to the tax benefit rule in 
Hillsboro. 
Conclusion 
The above analysis of section 265(1) demonstrates that the source 
rule is improper, and section 265(1) should not clutter the analysis of 
either a Manocchio type case or, for that matter, any case where tax-
exempt income is in the picture. The critical, and proper, analysis should 
proceed under the tax benefit rule and the inconsistent treatment analysis 
outlined in Parts I and I. 
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